In the months before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, US and British intelligence agencies concluded that Vladimir Putin had decided on war — yet many policymakers and allies initially struggled to accept the scale and imminence of the threat.
Intelligence collection and early signals
By late 2021, analysts at the Central Intelligence Agency and the UK’s Secret Intelligence Service — commonly known as MI6 — were tracking unusual Russian troop concentrations near Ukraine’s borders. Satellite imagery, intercepted communications and human intelligence pointed to logistical preparations inconsistent with a mere exercise.
The build-up included field hospitals, fuel depots and forward-positioned armour — indicators of offensive intent rather than symbolic manoeuvres. Intelligence assessments reportedly concluded that Russian forces were preparing for a multi-axis assault, including a thrust towards Kyiv.
Western agencies also assessed that Vladimir Putin believed Ukraine’s government would collapse quickly and that Western unity would fracture under pressure. This analysis shaped early diplomatic engagement, with Washington and London taking the unusual step of publicly declassifying parts of their intelligence to warn allies and deter Moscow.
The decision to go public
In an unprecedented move, US and UK officials released intelligence findings in near real time. The aim was twofold: to pre-empt Russian disinformation and to build a coalition response before hostilities began.
Declassification revealed not only troop movements but also alleged false-flag planning and narratives Moscow might use to justify intervention. By placing intelligence in the public domain, Western governments sought to undermine the element of surprise and demonstrate confidence in their assessments.
This strategy marked a departure from traditional intelligence secrecy. Officials calculated that transparency could strengthen credibility and constrain Russia’s information warfare tactics.
Why scepticism persisted
Despite detailed briefings, many European governments and segments of the public remained cautious. Several factors contributed to the doubt.
First, previous crises — including Russia’s troop deployments in 2014 and 2021 — had not resulted in immediate large-scale invasions. Some leaders assumed the build-up was coercive diplomacy rather than preparation for total war.
Second, memories of flawed intelligence in the run-up to the Iraq War cast a long shadow. Policymakers were wary of endorsing assessments that could later prove exaggerated.
Third, the geopolitical calculus appeared counterintuitive to some analysts. A full invasion risked severe sanctions, military losses and long-term isolation for Moscow. The scale of the predicted assault seemed economically and strategically costly.
When Russia launched its invasion on 24 February 2022, targeting multiple cities across Ukraine, the accuracy of US and UK warnings became evident. The early intelligence disclosures strengthened transatlantic coordination and facilitated rapid sanctions packages and military assistance.
The episode has since been studied as a case in modern intelligence strategy: an example of how classified information can be leveraged as a diplomatic tool. It also underscored a perennial tension in democratic societies — balancing scepticism with preparedness when confronted with high-stakes intelligence assessments.
In retrospect, the question was not whether the warnings were credible, but whether the political environment was ready to absorb them. The answer shaped the West’s initial response to Europe’s largest conflict since the Second World War.
Newshub Editorial in Europe – 26 February 2026
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