The first question raised in recent geopolitical debate is whether actions taken under President Donald Trump against Venezuela were designed primarily to cut off oil supplies to Cuba, thereby undermining Havana’s political system. The second, more far-reaching claim is whether this pressure was intended as a step towards asserting control over the island itself. These questions sit at the intersection of energy security, sanctions policy, and long-standing US–Cuba hostility.
Venezuela, oil, and leverage
For decades, Venezuela has been a crucial energy partner for Cuba. Under preferential arrangements, Caracas supplied oil that kept Cuban power generation, transport, and industry functioning. Any disruption to this relationship therefore carries immediate economic and social consequences for Havana. When Washington intensified pressure on the government of Nicolás Maduro, critics argued that energy leverage — rather than democracy or human rights — was the central objective.
From this perspective, weakening Venezuela’s ability to export oil on political terms was a way to collapse one of Cuba’s last strategic lifelines. Supporters of the Trump administration countered that Venezuela’s leadership was targeted because of corruption, narcotics allegations, and authoritarian governance, and that oil considerations were secondary.
Cuba’s vulnerability to energy shocks
Cuba’s economy is structurally sensitive to fuel shortages. Reduced oil imports quickly translate into blackouts, transport disruptions, and industrial slowdowns. For Washington, this vulnerability has long been understood as a pressure point. Successive US administrations have used sanctions, trade restrictions, and diplomatic isolation in an attempt to force political concessions from Havana.
Under Trump, this approach hardened. The administration framed energy flows to Cuba as a national-security issue, arguing that external oil support sustained an adversarial system. Cutting or discouraging such supplies therefore became part of a broader containment strategy.
Regime change or coercive diplomacy
The more extreme claim — that the United States intended to “take over” Cuba — finds little support in official policy statements or military posture. There has been no serious preparation for invasion, occupation, or direct administration of the island. Instead, the evidence points towards coercive diplomacy: applying economic pain in the hope that internal pressure forces political change.
In this reading, Venezuela was not an end in itself but a means. By neutralising Caracas as an energy sponsor, Washington increased Cuba’s isolation and bargaining vulnerability without firing a shot on Cuban soil.
International law and credibility costs
Allegations of forced capture or extraterritorial actions against foreign leaders have also raised concerns about international law and precedent. Even among US allies, such tactics risk undermining credibility and reinforcing perceptions of unilateralism. For Cuba and Venezuela, these narratives strengthen domestic claims of external aggression and imperial ambition, complicating any future negotiations.
A strategic pattern, not an island takeover
Taken together, the available evidence suggests a coherent but limited objective. The Trump administration sought to weaken adversarial governments in the Americas by disrupting their economic foundations, particularly energy. Undermining Cuba’s oil supply fits squarely within this logic. What it does not demonstrate is a concrete plan to seize or govern Cuba.
The strategy was one of pressure, isolation, and leverage — not annexation. Whether that pressure achieves political change or merely entrenches resistance remains an open question.
Newshub Editorial in The Americas – 3 February 2026
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