January 3, 2026 — Caracas / Bogotá / Brasília
The reported removal of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro has triggered an immediate and severe risk scenario inside Venezuela itself, with a very high probability of violence, fragmentation and prolonged instability. Far from guaranteeing a swift political transition, the disruption of central authority threatens to push the country into chaotic internal conflict with significant humanitarian and regional consequences.
With the Maduro government declaring a state of emergency and calling for the mobilisation of defence forces and civilians, the conditions for violent contestation have rapidly intensified. Venezuela’s constitutional order has been abruptly disrupted, and both government loyalists and opposition forces now face strong incentives to act decisively — and forcefully — to secure power, territory and legitimacy.
Immediate risk of violence and systemic chaos
Venezuela is not a consolidated democracy with resilient institutions capable of absorbing sudden leadership removal. Decades of authoritarian governance, deep political polarisation and repeated episodes of social upheaval have eroded institutional buffers. In such an environment, the sudden removal of the central figure around whom power has been organised creates a dangerous vacuum.
Rather than producing clarity, this vacuum is likely to accelerate instability as multiple actors attempt to fill it simultaneously. The absence of a widely accepted constitutional process or internal settlement dramatically raises the probability that political rivalry will turn violent within days rather than weeks.
Fragmentation risk within the armed forces
The Venezuelan armed forces and security apparatus have long been the backbone of Maduro’s rule. Historically deployed to suppress domestic opposition, these structures are not monolithic. Analysts have repeatedly warned that without a negotiated internal transition, loyalty within the military may fracture along factional, institutional or regional lines.
This fragmentation risk is a classic feature of externally imposed regime change. If security forces fail to cohesively realign behind a new and legitimate authority, splinter groups can emerge. These groups may engage in localised fighting — not only against opposition forces, but against each other — creating multiple conflict zones rather than a single, controllable front.
Opposition divisions and uncertain leadership
Venezuela’s opposition landscape remains deeply divided. There is no single, unified leadership with broad legitimacy and operational control capable of assuming governance seamlessly. Past elections, protests and transitional attempts have repeatedly exposed fractures within opposition movements, reflecting competing visions for the country’s future.
In the absence of a clear transition framework, these divisions may escalate rapidly. Political rivalry can turn into armed confrontation if factions — whether aligned with remnants of the old regime or emerging power centres — seek territorial control or political dominance. This dynamic significantly complicates any prospect of orderly stabilisation.
Civil conflict versus full-scale civil war
Most conflict analysts assess that immediate nationwide civil war is possible but not the most likely short-term outcome. Far more probable is a prolonged period of violent instability characterised by low-intensity conflict and insurgency rather than formal warfare between organised armies.
This pattern typically includes skirmishes between pro- and anti-government militias, urban unrest and street fighting in major cities, armed criminal groups exploiting the collapse of authority, and regional breakdowns where certain states or provinces become semi-autonomous conflict zones. Such conditions are consistent with cases where regimes collapse abruptly without negotiated settlements or credible transitional authorities.
Humanitarian collapse and mass displacement
Any escalation of violence will dramatically worsen an already severe humanitarian crisis. Even before the current events, Venezuela faced one of the largest migration flows in the region due to economic collapse, shortages of food and medicine, and political repression.
Renewed violence would accelerate civilian displacement, drive mass migration into neighbouring countries, and further degrade basic services and public order. Desperate populations are particularly vulnerable to recruitment by armed groups, reinforcing a vicious cycle of instability and violence observed in other disorderly regime-change scenarios.
Regional spillovers and external actors
Instability inside Venezuela carries immediate regional implications. Neighbouring states such as Colombia and Brazil already fear refugee surges and border destabilisation. Should violence intensify, these countries may face pressure to intervene diplomatically — or even militarily — to protect borders and manage humanitarian fallout.
At the same time, foreign governments that have historically supported Maduro could covertly back internal factions, further internationalising what began as a domestic crisis and complicating any path to resolution.
A precise risk assessment
In the immediate phase, spanning days to weeks, violence is highly likely around major population centres. Armed clashes between loyalists, opposition groups and fragmented security forces pose a serious risk of civilian casualties and widespread disorder.
In the short term, over weeks to months, authority may fragment further, with armed groups and regional power brokers asserting control, leading to intermittent conflict across large parts of the country.
In the medium term, over months to years, failure to establish a legitimate and stable government could push Venezuela into prolonged low-intensity civil conflict. This scenario resembles state failure rather than conventional civil war, yet still carries significant bloodshed and social breakdown.
The probability assessment is stark: the risk of classic civil-war-style nationwide fighting is medium, while the risk of sustained violent instability involving multiple armed actors is very high.
Conclusion: instability is the most likely outcome
The risk of internal war in Venezuela is not theoretical. Removing Maduro without a clear, internally agreed transition plan makes prolonged instability a realistic and serious outcome. Rather than immediate peace or democratic renewal, the most likely trajectory is a drawn-out period of fragmented authority, armed clashes and humanitarian collapse.
What unfolds next will depend less on external declarations and more on whether Venezuelan institutions — political, military and civic — can coalesce around a credible and legitimate transition before violence becomes self-sustaining.
Newshub Editorial in South America – January 3, 2026
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